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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership 
concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms. 
We find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks 
engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute 
monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm 
value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the 
significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within 
family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. 
Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive 
moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating 
effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. An implication of this 
research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate 
policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as 
monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications 
for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Generally, the extant corporate governance literature focuses upon the agency problem 
between shareholders and managers or Agency Problem Type I (De Cesari, 2012; Liew et.al., 
2017) which commonly prevail in firms with dispersed shareholding (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). However, in firms with high concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders have the 
tendency to expropriate minority shareholders (De Cesari, 2012). This is generally referred to 
as Agency Problem Type II – principal-principal problem. This problem is particularly 
prevalent in emerging markets (Ahlstrom et.al., 2010; Liu et.al., 2010; Young et.al., 2018). 
Minority shareholder expropriation in the context of Agency Problem Type II in 
emerging markets has been examined extensively in the literature (Faccio et. al., 2001b; De 
Cesari, 2012; Cueto, 2013; Liew et.al., 2015) where most firms are family-owned, and they 
tend to expropriate minority shareholders. Some researchers claim that reputational effects can 
mitigate this expropriation problem (Gomes, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Liew et.al., 2015). Wang (2006, p.622), observed that “a founding family firm 
with its unique concentrated ownership is less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior as it 
potentially could damage the family's reputation, wealth and long-term firm performance”. 
However, others opine that reputational effects are not effective in reducing minority 
shareholder expropriation especially during economic recessions (Peng and Jiang, 2010; 
Johnson et. al., 2000). Sageder et.al. (2018) provide a comprehensive discussion on extant 
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research on reputation and image of family firms. They suggest (citing Chen et al. 2010; Dyer 
and Whetten, 2006) that family firms avoid actions that could damage their reputations. 
Malaysia, provides an interesting setting to examine family firms and their relationship with 
their stakeholders, particularly, their banks. World Bank (2012) reported that traditional family 
groups are still an important part of the corporate landscape, wherein about 10-12 family groups 
control a range of companies through a mix of direct and indirect ownership and shareholder 
agreements. Claessens, Djankov & Lang (2000) reported that about 70% of Malaysian 
companies are family-controlled firms. Additionally, family firms represent an essential part 
of the Malaysian economy and contribute more than half of Malaysia's Gross Domestic Product 
(Ngui, 2002). Further, it was reported substantial transactions, including large related-party 
transactions, do not require qualified or super majority approval and generally, investor 
protection is low (World Bank, 2012, p.3).  
Some prominent Malaysian family businessmen are Robert Kuok (Kuok Brothers) or 
more well-known as ‘Sugar-King’, Quek Leng Chan (Public Bank Group), Tuanku Abdullah 
Tuanku Abdul Rahman (Melewar Group), Tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir (Sapura Holdings 
Berhad), and T. Ananda Krishnan (Tanjong Berhad) (Lode and Noh, 2018). Interestingly most 
of the Malaysian family firms evolved from small enterprises and became giant conglomerates 
(Grant Thornton, 2002). Generally, family firms, on average, experience higher firm value than 
non-family firms (Ibrahim, 2009). Some of these firms operate in industries with absolute 
monopoly as well given the political economy of Malaysia (Gomez et. al., 2018). 
Unfortunately, a corporate scandal, the Transmile case3  in 2007, involving the Kuok 
family group which held 18% ownership in Transmile), raised the visibility of family firms. It 
was reported that Transmile owed money to more than 10 local and foreign financial 
institutions (The Star, 2010). After 3 years the Transmile board sued its former managing 
director and former chief financial officer, as an attempt to clear the company’s name (The 
Edge, 2010). Given, the publicity attracted by this case and subsequent corporate governance 
reforms since 2007, we posit that reputational effects may play a role in reducing minority 
shareholder appropriation.  
Extant literature on bank-firm relationship shows that a strong relationship with banks 
can reduce information asymmetries, improve the firm’s success to credit and lead to an overall 
improvement in the firm’s performance and thus, firm value (Castelli et.al., 2012). Conversely, 
increased domestic banking relationship with family firms provides opportunities for minority 
shareholder expropriation to extract financial resources from their firms (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). We summise that the more banks a firm engages indicates greater opportunities for 
appropriate. 
Amran and Ahmad (2009), who examined sample firms for the period 2000 to 2003, 
observed that family businesses need to be treated differently from non-family businesses due 
to the different nature of the firms, with a high sense of familiness. They did not elaborate on 
what is meant by sense of familiness. We believe it could be the concern for reputation as 
espoused by Sageder et.al. (2018). 
However, the question arises as to whether ownership concentration effects the   
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value. 
Since, ownership in Malaysia is considerably concentrated with poor investor protection, 
controlling shareholders in family firms may have significant influence on the firms’ activities 
or engagement with external parties by expropriating resources from it. Hence, there is a need 
to examine this moderating effect. Additionally, the extant literature does not evidence whether 
 
3 In the Transmile case which occurred in early 2007, the firm’s revenue was inflated in the financial statement (Securities Commission, 
2011b). This is a dent to the corporate reputation of family firms in this country as Transmile at that time is owned by the Kuok family 
which is one of the large family business groups in Malaysia. 
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the firm value effect of the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm and the moderating 
effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on this firm value effect, is stronger in Malaysian 
family firms than non-family firms.  
This provides a setting to examine whether corporate reputational effects may influence 
the moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership in family firms as family 
controlling shareholders have the incentives to improve their corporate reputation as poor 
reputation can affect them, their family members and close associates within the firm. Hence, 
it would be timely to investigate this relationship.  
Additionally, the Malaysian corporate landscape includes another important corporate 
ownership type- Government Linked Investment Companies (GLICs): Seven investment funds 
are considered “government linked”, with government oversight and participation on their 
board, usually through the Ministry of Finance and directly hold about 30 percent of total 
market capitalization. They control a number of companies—known as Government Linked 
Companies (GLCs)—and have minority stakes in dozens more. They also invest in several 
dozen non-listed companies, and are major investors in government and corporate bonds, and 
property (World Bank, 2012). World Bank (2012) further raises concern whether GLCs and 
private companies face a truly level playing field (p.24) and is doubtful if related party 
transactions are adequately disclosed (p.32). Hence, in this study GLCs are excluded as they 
have significant engagements with many domestic commercial banks which ultimately have 
impacts firm values. As such, our findings contribute to the corporate governance literature by 
providing evidence on the relationship of domestic banks engaged with by  family and non-
family firms (excluding GLCs) within the Malaysian institutional context. Interestingly we find 
that, after excluding firms operating in industries where they have absolute monopoly because 
of their favoured positions (Gomez et al, 2018), there is a significant negative relationship 
between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value among family 
firms and non-family firms with concentrated ownership. 
This study has two theoretical contributions. First, it deepens our understanding of 
ownership structure and firm value. Evidence on the moderating role of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership extends the existing theorisation of ownership. It demonstrates how 
controlling shareholders influence expropriation through the domestic banking channel. 
Second, a new perspective to agency theory is added as the extant literature does not articulate 
the interplay between agency theory, corporate reputational effects and financial crisis within 
a single analysis. Our findings reinforce the relevance of good corporate governance as a 
reference for other emerging markets which share similar characteristics of highly concentrated 
ownership and predominantly family-owned firms with similar potential Agency Type II 
problems.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the Malaysian 
institutional setting, evaluates the extant corporate governance literature and develops the 
relevant hypotheses; Section 3 explains how the research is conducted; Section 4 discusses the 
descriptive statistics, endogeneity problems and research results; Section 5 summarises the 
research findings and discusses its implications and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional setting, literature review and hypotheses development  
 
2.1. Malaysian institutional setting: Corporate governance landscape and regulatory 
framework  
 
The Malaysian corporate governance landscape changed significantly with the introduction of 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000. This code was altered in 2007 
(Liew et.al., 2017; Securities Commission, 2007). The MCCG 2007 emphasised that the board 
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of directors and audit committees should be strong and ensure that the board of directors and 
audit committees carry out their duties effectively (Liew et.al., 2017; Securities Commission, 
2007). To further enhance reforms, the Securities Commission (SC) created the Corporate 
Governance Blueprint 2011 in 2011 (Liew et.al., 2017; Securities Commission, 2011a). This 
blueprint focused on the rights of equity holders, responsibility of institutional shareholders, 
responsibility of the board in corporate governance, enhancing proper disclosure and 
transparency, responsibility of important stakeholders and quality of implementation (Liew 
et.al., 2017; Asian Corporate Governance Association, 2012). For the execution of the 
Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011, the SC made additional amendments to the MCCG 
2007 in 2012 (Liew et.al., 2017; Securities Commission, 2012). The MCCG 2012, replacing 
the 2007 code, spelt out the procedures for the board of directors to practice good corporate 
governance in their firms’ business activities and related activities inside their firms (Liew 
et.al., 2017; Securities Commission, 2012).  
In 2016, the SC further revised the MCCG 2012 (Liew et.al., 2017; Securities 
Commission, 2016). The MCCG 2016 introduced additional procedures for good board 
practice (Liew et.al., 2017), namely, additional approval process for independent directors with 
tenure more than 9 years and the requirement for large companies to appoint 30% women 
directors on their boards (Foo, 2017). 
Despite all these efforts, these codes failed to enhance good corporate governance 
because the adoption and implementation of these codes are only voluntary. The SC only 
required public-listed firms either to comply or to explain any deviation from the codes with 
regards to their firms’ activities in their annual reports (Securities Commission, 2007, 2012; 
Wahab et.al., 2007). Given the codes are not mandatory, an opportunity arises for Malaysian 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Another significant development in the Malaysian corporate governance scene is the 
formation of external mechanisms to protect minority shareholders (Wahab et.al., 2011). The 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was formed in February 1999 by the High-
Level Finance Committee to protect the rights of minority shareholders and enhance 
shareholder activism (Wahab et.al., 2011). The MSWG aimed at promoting shareholder 
activism regarding poor business ethics; monitoring corporate governance malpractices by 
public-listed firms as well as to providing training on shareholder activism and the advantages 
of good business ethics to society (Wahab et.al., 2011). The creation of MSWG was expected 
to reduce minority shareholder expropriation and enhance corporate governance among public-
listed firms (MSWG, 2012). The shortcoming, however, was that MSWG did not possess the 
legal power to litigate cases of minority shareholder expropriation. It can only promote 
shareholder activism among investors and provide training to them with the purpose of creating 
awareness and reducing minority shareholder expropriation. Therefore, MSWG’s effectiveness 
in reducing minority shareholder expropriation remains a concern. 
 
2.2 Minority shareholder expropriation 
 
Figure 1 shows Agency Problem Type I that occurs between individual shareholders and 
professional managers. In the bottom panel of Figure 1, the slanting arrow shows the 
relationship between the controlling shareholders and their closely-related managers. These 
closely-related managers could be family members or close friends who report directly to the 
controlling shareholders (Liew et.al., 2017; Young et.al., 2008). The straight line showing the 
conflict is drawn between the closely-related managers – who represent the controlling 
shareholders - and the minority shareholders. Agency Problem Type II in developing countries 
is different from Agency Problem Type I in developed countries. This difference is shown by 
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Figure 1 where the main problem is between the controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Liew et.al., 2017; Young et.al., 2008).  
The controlling shareholders and minority shareholders’ conflict of interest (Agency 
Problem Type II) is a significant problem in developing countries (Liew et.al., 2017; Jiang and 
Peng, 2011; Young et.al., 2008). Young et.al. (2008) argue that this agency problem is more 
severe in family firms. The presence of private objectives within family firm owners can cause 
them to take actions, which advance their family welfare at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Schulze et.al., 2001). These preferences cannot be fully quantified financially 
(Bergstrom, 1989). In addition, the utility that family firm owners gain from indulging in 
private objectives is indistinguishable from the utility that they obtained from rationally 
motivated actions (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). These private 
objectives can translate in many forms and one of these is the appointment of family members 
as agents of the firm (Faccio et.al., 2001c; Young et.al., 2008). Founding families of family 
firms can expropriate minority shareholders by appointing less-than-qualified family members 
or associates, friends or cronies to be agents of its firm (Faccio et.al., 2001c). They can decide 
who sits on the board, therefore, effectively neutralize a board‘s ability to oversee the family 
controlling shareholder. In addition, legal recourse for boards not overseeing minority 
shareholders‘ interests are limited. Such arrangements coupled with limited legal recourse 
provide family controlling shareholders the power to expropriate minority shareholders (Young 
et.al., 2008). Hence, it is argued that principal-principal conflict is more prevalent in family 
firms as compared to non-family firms. However, Lazano et. al (2016) suggest that the conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for firms in environments with higher 
investor protection. 
 
Figure 1: Principal-principal conflict vs. principal-agent conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: Young et.al. (2008) 
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2.3. Family Firms, Reputation and Corporate Governance  
 
As discussed above, family firms are prevalent in the Malaysian business landscape. Arguably, 
family firms pose challenges to corporate governance due to their unique characteristics 
(Filatotchev et. at., 2005).  Interestingly, most of the Malaysian family firms evolved from 
small enterprises and became giant conglomerates (Grant Thornton, 2002). Many of these 
family businessmen are prominent Malaysians  including Robert Kuok (Kuok Brothers) or 
more well-known as ‘Sugar-King’, Quek Leng Chan (Public Bank Group), Tuanku Abdullah 
Tuanku Abdul Rahman (Melewar Group), Tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir (Sapura Holdings 
Berhad), and T. Ananda Krishnan (Tanjong Berhad) (Lode and Noh, 2018). Examining sample 
firms for the period 2000 to 2003, Amran and Ahmad (2009) observed that family businesses 
need to be treated differently from non-family businesses due to the different nature of the 
firms, which rely on an intemal control system and have a high sense of familiness. They did 
not elaborate on what is meant by sense of familiness. Németh et. al. (2017) refer to this as “the 
manifestations of the unique resources coming from the family involvement” (p.32). The 70% 
of richest Malaysians announced by the Malaysian Business in February 2009 are in family 
businesses (Samad and Ibrahim, 2011). Of these, Tan Sri Robert Kuok appears to dominate, 
accounting for 27.6 percent of the wealth of the 40 richest (Singh, 2009). Some of the early 
family business founders have absolute monopoly or dominate some industries. For example, 
Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad and Genting predominate the gambling industry. These family 
firms do have visibility and under political cost hypothesis (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990) attract 
greater scrutiny and therefore, will not do anything that may damage their reputation. 
Generally, family firms’ long-term orientation and reputation-related concerns 
encourages them to value firm survival over the maximization of short-term wealth, resulting 
in fewer agency conflicts and increased resource accessibility (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Yang, 2010). Consequently, family firms avoid actions that could damage their reputations 
(Chen et al. 2010; Dyer and Whetten 2006). In economies with less developed capital markets 
and limited professional managers, many family firms are established by obtaining capital and 
human investments from families and personal networks (McConaughy et.al., 2001). Hence, 
through business networks, uncertainties and complexity are reduced because information is 
shared and circulated among the participants in the network, resulting in better monitoring of 
activities both within and between firms. This is especially effective in East Asia as financing 
is relationship-based, and the presence of owners in family-controlled firms should be 
associated with better growth and higher firm value (Filatotchev et. at., 2005). 
Interestingly, Mazzelli et. al. (2018) introduce a concept known as “conformity-in-
distinctiveness” where family firms conform to the behaviour of other family firms rather than 
industry norms in order to avoid social losses. By contrast, another concept ‘‘distinctiveness-
inconformity’’ introduced for non-family firms, which for economic reasons, are less likely to 
imitate the innovations of non-family firms than the innovations of family firms. Furthermore, 
Mazzelli et al. (2018) in a study of Spanish manufacturing firms suggest that family firms are 
more responsive to new product introductions of firms in the region in which they are located. 
From a corporate governance perspective, Lazano et al (2016) suggest that the conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor 
protection. It is interesting to note that family firms, compared with non-family firms, place 
more emphasis in business market leadership (Gudmundson et. at., 1999).  
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2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
2.3.1 The number of domestic banks engaging with the firm  
 
It is observed that banks can carry out effective monitoring of their borrowers because they 
possess the expertise and resources to screen out the bad borrowers from the good borrowers 
(Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). Using the theory of financial intermediation based on 
minimising the cost of monitoring borrowers’ information, Diamond (1984) argue it is useful 
for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It is believed that banks, 
particularly domestic banks can lower monitoring costs and hence, they are good monitors. 
Consequently, the bank-firm relationship can reduce information asymmetries, improve the 
firm’s success to credit and lead to an overall improvement in the firm’s performance (Castelli 
et.al., 2012). 
However, there are disadvantages for domestic banks, namely, a close relationship with 
customers (borrowers) may ultimately lead to higher lending to borrowers (Focarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2000) which could lead to extraction of financial resources in an environment with 
poor institutional governance (Faccio et.al., 2001b). Furthermore, expropriation through 
domestic banks is more serious in family firms compared to non-family firms because family 
controlling shareholders can use their relationship with domestic banks to extract financial 
resources from their firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Hence, in an emerging market setting 
where investor protection is relatively poorer; it is argued that the disadvantages of the 
domestic banking system outweigh its benefits as it could be used as a tool for expropriation 
particularly by family controlling shareholders. The more domestic banks that are engaged by 
highly concentrated firms such as family firms; the more opportunities are available for 
expropriation by the family controlling shareholders.  
These opportunities to expropriate can come in the form of loan expropriation. The issue 
of loan expropriation can be argued to be potentially more severe in family firms compared to 
non-family firms because family owners can use the loans to enhance their private objectives 
such as firm survival at the expense of minority shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This 
difference is attributed to the failure of the disciplinary effects of debt to impose higher costs 
on family controlling shareholders compared to their expropriation benefits (Ellul et.al., 2007; 
Faccio et.al., 2001a). Firstly, in family firms, controlling shareholders usually take up 
managerial positions and their performance is not necessarily tied to the debt liabilities of the 
firm. This is different from professional managers who generally care about the associated loss 
of job tenure or reputation as a result of debt default and insolvency (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008). 
Secondly, reputational considerations in family firms with pyramidal ownership and cross-
shareholdings can be intrinsically weak because if an affiliated firm goes bankrupt because of 
excessive leverage, it may be difficult to pin accountability on the controlling shareholder 
immersed in the complex corporate structure of its firm. Both these factors contribute to the 
failure of the disciplinary effects of debt on family firms and due to this failure; family 
controlling shareholders may expropriate the loans obtained from banks (Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2008). Hence, loan expropriation is argued to be potentially more severe in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. The higher the number of domestic banks engaged by family 
firms, the higher the amount of loans that they can obtain from these banks which results in 
higher amount of loans that are available for family owners to expropriate. As a result, it is 
expected that an increase in the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms will 
increase the agency costs of the firm, thus, reducing firm value.  
Moreover, Bliss and Gul (2012a) and Bliss and Gul (2012b) have found that politically-
connected firms in Malaysia possess higher cost of debt due to their higher financial risks as 
well as having higher leverage. These studies support the notion that Malaysian firms establish 
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close relationships with the banking sector to derive benefits. In this paper, we argue that family 
firms also have such close relationships particularly with domestic banks and these 
relationships are not beneficial to family firm’s minority shareholders based upon the 
Malaysian political economy as well as the explanations provided in this section. 
Therefore, it is argued that the higher the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm, 
the more likely that minority shareholder expropriation occurs, especially, in family firms. We 
posit that the number of banks may be a proxy for expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
H1a: There is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 
H1b:  If there is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms, this negative relationship is likely to be 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
  
2.3.2 Moderating effects of the controlling shareholder’s ownership concentration, 
expropriation and firm value  
 
Given the prominence of ownership concentration in the emerging markets context (Claessens 
et al., 2000; Morck and Yeung, 2003), it will be interesting to whether ownership concentration 
moderates the relationship between the number of domestic banks and firm value. Further, in 
these markets, particularly in Asia, it is observed that ownership concentration is positively 
related to firm value (Heugens et al., 2009) (hence, a positive moderating effect of ownership 
concentration is expected).  
Given the institutional context of emerging markets, investors need to act as good firm 
monitors. However, they can only do so by increasing their shareholding. Large shareholding 
makes them more involved in their firms’ corporate governance and enable them to leverage 
over their subordinates (David et al., 2007). Consequently, controlling shareholders can 
influence the management to align their interests with theirs (Heugens et al., 2009). Hence, 
increased ownership concentration may permit controlling shareholders to tighten their firm 
control, therefore, reducing Agency Problem Type I. This creates a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value (hence, a positive moderating effect of 
ownership concentration on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and firm value). 
Additionally, in the Malaysian institutional context, arguably, after the Transmile 
scandal, corporate reputational effects can positively moderate family controlling shareholders’ 
ownership on expropriation. This is applicable to family firms where the family owns a large 
shareholding.  Family owners with large shareholding would like to improve their reputation 
as they and their family members can be affected by negative reputation (Gomez, 1999; Loy, 
2010).  
The effects of reputation work as follows:  When the shareholding of family owners 
increase, they tend to maintain their reputation by reducing minority shareholder expropriation.  
Thus, increased shareholding aligns the interests of family owners with the interests of minority 
shareholders (Loy, 2010) which reduces the principal-principal conflict. Therefore, this creates 
a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the firm value effects 
of controlling shareholders’ expropriation. 
As family owners’ shareholding increase, tunneling also becomes less viable for 
controlling shareholders to extract resources from their firms, as there will be less minority 
shareholders to expropriate (Heugens et al., 2009). Thus, tunneling will just result in a direct 
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shift of private wealth from one avenue to the other, which is not beneficial to the family 
owners, except maybe for spending reasons (Heugens et al., 2009). A better strategy for 
controlling shareholders to increase their private wealth is to manage the firm to perform better, 
hence, very high shareholding is likely to positively influence firm performance (Heugens et 
al., 2009). 
Based on the above, it is hypothesised that controlling shareholders’ ownership is likely 
to positively moderate the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value. 
Based upon these explanations, the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
H2a: There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value 
in Malaysian firms. 
 
H2b: If there is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value 
in Malaysian family firms, this positive moderating effect is likely to be stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. 
 
H2c: There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership at very 
high ownership concentration on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that 
the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 
H2d: If there is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership at very 
high ownership concentration on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that 
the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian family firms, this positive moderating effect 
is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
3.1. Sample 
 
We use secondary data related to the types of controlling shareholder, financial data and board 
of directors’ information for the period 2007-2009. This is a period of economic recession 
(2007-2009) (Mishkin, 2016). This period is chosen because corporate governance matters 
more during periods of economic recessions (Johnson et.al., 2000). Further, this period follows 
the Transmile scandal in 2007 that may evidence concerns regarding family firm reputational 
effects. The chosen period of study enables analyses of the interplay between agency theory, 
corporate reputational effects and the financial crisis in a single study. All the data are obtained 
from annual reports of public-listed firms as well as from Bloomberg database.  
In this study, family firms are defined as firms which are controlled by individuals or 
families with at least 20% voting rights (Chakrabarty, 2009)4 as well as family inclusion in 
their firms’ governance. For the latter, this requires at least one family member holding a 
position at a managerial level (i.e. directors, CEO or chairman, syndicate pact chairman) 
(Cascino et.al., 2010).  
 
 
 
4 The 20% minimum level is used as most (76%) of the family firm owners in the Main Market Bursa Malaysia 
own a minimum of 20% shareholding. 
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Table 1 shows how the final sample of family firms from 2007 to 2009 is derived.  
 
Table 1: Description of data set selected for family firms 
 
Data Description Number of Companies 
Total Main Market family firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia and could be utilized in the 
research, as at 31st December 2007  
498 
Minus : Financial related family firms 48 
Minus : Family firms with missing data 3 
Minus : Family firms with at least 20% 
family ownership but no family members 
involved in management 
30 
Minus : Family firms with less than 20% 
family ownership 
38 
Number of Family Firms available for 
observation 
379 
 
Table 2 shows how the final sample of non-family firms from 2007 to 2009 is derived.  
 
Table 2: Description of data set selected for non-family firms 
 
Data Description Number of Companies 
Total Main Market non-family firms listed 
on Bursa Malaysia and could be utilized in 
the research, as at 31st December 2007  
223 
Minus : Government-linked companies 
(GLCs) 
59 
Minus : Financial related non-family firms 24 
Minus : Non-family firms with missing data 6 
Minus : Non-family firms with less than 20% 
ownership by controlling shareholders 
42 
Number of Non-family Firms available for 
observation 
92 
 
3.2.Variables Definition And Measurement  
 
Table 3 explains the proxies used to measure the dependent variables in this study : 
 
Table 3: Dependent variables and measurement 
 
No. Dependent Variable Measurement 
 
1 Firm value 
Proxy 1 
Proxy is  Tobin’s Q (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang, 2004).  
Tobin’s Q is calculated by the ratio of (Total Market Value 
of Equity + Total Book Value of Liabilities)/ (Total Book 
Value of Equity + Total Book Value of Liabilities) 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Faccio et.al., 2001a; Yermack, 
1996). 
11 
 
2 Firm value 
Proxy 2 
As an alternative measure to firm value, the market to book 
value (MBV) is also used. MBV is calculated as the ratio 
of the multiplication of the number of equity shares and 
the closing price of the stock on the last day of the financial 
year to total equity (Reddy, Locke and Scrimgeour, 2010; 
Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000). MBV is a better measure than 
Tobin’s Q and has been used in emerging market research 
(e.g. by Xu and Wang (1997) on China), as well in other 
studies (Capon et.al., 1996). This measure is also more 
directed to shareholders’ objectives (Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2000). However, it does not consider debt. Hence, both 
Tobin’s Q and MBV are utilised in this research to ensure 
robustness of different measures of market-based 
performance. 
 
3 Return On Equity 
(ROE) 
Proxy 3 
Return on Equity (ROE) is used as part of the accounting-
based performance measures for this kind of study 
(Ibrahim, 2009). ROE is calculated by Net Income / Total 
Common Equity (Holderness and Sheehan 1988; Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991). 
 
4 Return On Asset (ROA) 
Proxy 4 
Return on Asset (ROA) is used as part of the accounting-
based performance measures for this kind of study 
(Ibrahim, 2009). ROA is calculated by Net Income / Total 
Assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Holderness and 
Sheehan 1988).  
 
 
Table 4 explains the independent variables used in this study: 
 
Table 4: Independent and control variables and measurement 
 
Main 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Description 
The Number of 
Domestic Banks 
That The Firm 
Engages With 
(Banks) 
 
This value is measured based upon the annual report’s disclosure. 
Control 
Variables 
In line with prior corporate governance literature, we control for fifteen 
variables, namely, (1) Ownership concentration (OC) (2) Squared 
Ownership Concentration (3) Average tenure of independent directors 
(Tenure); (4) Related party transactions which are likely to result in 
expropriation; (5) Firm size (SIZE); (6) Firm risk (RISK); (7) Leverage 
(LEV); and (8) Proportion of independent directors (IDR); (9) Firm age 
(AGE); (10) Non-affiliated block holders (NAB); (11) Sales growth (SG); 
(12) R & D expenditure-to-sales (RDS); (13) Capital expenditure-to-sales 
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(CS); (14) Marketing and advertising expenditure-to-sales (MS) and (15) 
Firm Type. 
 
3.3 Research model 
 
For hypotheses testing, panel data analysis using the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) is used 
because the FEM can address any endogeneity problems effectively (Chi, 2005). The panel 
data regression is conducted on both family firms and non-family firms. The model for this 
research is as follows: 
 
Family Firm Model  
 
Yit = β0 + β1(Banks)it + β2(OC)it(Banks)it + β3(OCSQUARED)it(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + 
β5(OCSQUARED)it + ∑ 𝛽2009𝑖=2007 i(Control Variables)t + µ it   
 
Non-Family Firm Model 
 
Yit = β0 + β1(Banks)it + β2(OC)it(Banks)it + β3(OCSQUARED)it(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + 
β5(OCSQUARED)it + ∑ 𝛽2009𝑖=2007 i(Control Variables)t + µ it  
  
 
Combined Model (Family And Non-Family Firms) 
 
Yit = β0 + β1(Banks)it + β2(FT)it + β3(FT)it(Banks)it + β4(FT)it(OC)it(Banks)it + 
β5(FT)it(OCSQUARED)it(Banks)it + β6(OC)it + β7(OCSQUARED)it + ∑ 𝛽2009𝑖=2007 i(Control 
Variables)t + µ it  
 
Yit : Tobin’s Q at year  t, Market-to-Book Value Ratio at year  t, Return On Equity at year  t, 
Return On Asset at year  t. 
 
Banksit : The number of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t. 
FTit: Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for non-family firms. 
(FT)it(Banks)it : Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for non-family firms 
multiplied by the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t. 
(OC)it(Banks)it: Controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t. 
(OCSQUARED)it(Banks)it: Squared of controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration in 
the firm at year t multiplied by the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t. 
(FT)it(OC)it(Banks)it: Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for non-family 
firms multiplied by the controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the number of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t. 
(FT)it(OCSQUARED)it(Banks)it: Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for 
non-family firms multiplied by the squared of controlling shareholders’ ownership 
concentration in the firm at year t multiplied by the number of domestic banks engaged by the 
firm at year t. 
OCit: Controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration in the firm at year t (%) 
OCSQUAREDit: Squared of controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration in the firm at 
year t (%) 
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Control Variables 
SIZEit: Firm Size (Ln (Total Assets)) at year t 
RISKit: ln (Firm Risk (Standard Deviation of monthly stock returns from 2007-2009)) at year 
t 
LEVit: ln (Leverage (Long-term Debt/Total Assets)) at year t 
IDRit: Independent Directors Ratio (No. of independent directors/Board Size) at year t 
NABit: Non-affiliated Block Holder Shareholding at year t 
AGEit: ln (Age) at year t 
SGit: Sales Growth at year t  
RDSit : Research and Development Expenditure-to-Sales at year  t 
CSit: Capital Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
MSit: Marketing and Advertising Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
RPTit : Amount of Related Party Transactions That Are Likely to Result in Expropriation at 
year t divided by Total Related Party Transactions Value at year t. 
Tenureit: Average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t. 
µ it: Stochastic error term at year t 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Issues And Research Results  
  
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample  
Family Firms 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Tobin’s Q 0.8780 0.7801 0.5226 7.0322 0.0631 
ROE  0.0396 0.0688  0.3043  3.0037  -5.3488  
ROA  0.0323  0.0386  0.0810 0.4117 -0.6432  
Market-to-Book Value (MBV) 0.8027 0.5849 1.0694 16.2962 -0.3955 
Related Party Transactions 
That  Are Likely To Result In 
Expropriation  Ratio (RPT) 
0.3285 0.1843 0.3528 0.9997  0.0000 
Ownership Concentration  42.1420  41.1800  13.3102  99.1600  20.1800  
Squared Ownership 
Concentration 
1,952.952 1,695.792 1,224.922 9,832.706 407.2324 
Average Independent Directors’ 
Tenure  
6.0354  5.3330  3.8628 31.0000  0.0000  
Banks 2.8179 2.0000 1.7385 10.0000 0.0000 
Ln(Firm Risk) -2.2835 -2.3327 0.9758 1.2590 -5.3454 
Leverage  0.1323  0.0885  0.1831  2.7988  0.0000  
Firm Size  19.6350  19.4900  1.2024  24.4960  16.9470  
Independent Directors Ratio  0.4240  0.4000  0.1135 0.8330  0.1820  
Non-affiliated Block Holders 27.2503 14.7600 38.9662 339.2600 0.0000 
Ln(Age) 2.9626 3.0910 0.7287 4.6347 0.0000 
Sales Growth 14.4226 6.4538 93.2761 2254.7070 -96.8719 
R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 0.1445 0.0000 1.8187 35.6826 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 9.2843 3.6383 27.2080 561.4003 -37.0511 
Marketing and Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
2.3014 0.4010 4.0991 62.0660 0.0000 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample  
Non-Family Firms 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Tobin’s Q 1.1582 0.8812 1.0831 11.3300 0.2553 
ROE  0.0577 0.0889 1.0485 2.5277 -20.7650 
ROA  0.0695 0.0563 0.5531 11.0594 -1.8846 
Market-to-Book Value 
(MBV) 
1.3298 0.7493 2.7994 34.8749 -2.4040 
Related Party 
Transactions That  Are 
Likely To Result In 
Expropriation  Ratio 
(RPT) 
0.1483 0.0000 0.2905 0.9955 0.0000 
Ownership Concentration  46.0735 48.4100 15.9517 89.6200 2.1000 
Squared Ownership 
Concentration 
2,376.667 2,343.528 1,531.335 8,031.744 4.4100 
Average Independent 
Directors’ Tenure  
6.0393 5.0000 4.1113 20.3330 0.0000 
Banks 2.4084 2.0000 1.4059 10.0000 0.0000 
Ln(Firm Risk) 0.2876 0.1635 0.3615 2.7491 0.0063 
Leverage  0.1257 0.0731 0.1403 0.6967 0.0000 
Firm Size  20.1482 19.8880 1.4059 24.9910 16.3070 
Independent Directors 
Ratio  
0.4283 0.4000 0.1166 0.8330 0.1430 
Non-affiliated Block 
Holders 
55.2784 24.5630 82.9609  517.6300 0.0000 
Ln(Age) 24.5828 21.0000 16.4803 118.0000 1.0000 
Sales Growth 7.1040 4.8082 43.7810 418.1182 -87.1248 
R&D Expenditure-to-
Sales 
0.0804 0.0000 0.4510 5.9684 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales 
7.7666 3.4241 15.1208 207.9674 0.0000 
Marketing and 
Advertising Expenditure-
to-Sales 
3.3794 0.0000 7.1290 59.1911 0.0000 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix (family firms) 
 
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCSQUARED AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS 
Q 1.00                   
MBV 0.62 1.00                  
ROE 0.09 0.12 1.00                 
ROA 0.20 0.17 0.58 1.00                
RPT 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00               
OC 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.14 1.00              
OCSQUARED 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.99 1.00             
AIDT -0.02 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.09 1.00            
BANKS 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 1.00           
LNRISK 0.33 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.01 1.00          
LEV 0.30 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.06 0.16 1.00         
FSIZE 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.29 0.11 0.53 0.32 1.00        
IDR -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 1.00       
NAB -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.00 0.04 
-
0.08 1.00 
     
LNAGE 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.17 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.14 -0.04 0.22 0.13 -0.04 1.00     
SG 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 
-
0.05 0.07 -0.05 1.00 
   
RDS 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.02 1.00   
CS 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 1.00  
MS 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
-
0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 1.00 
 
Q : Tobin’s Q; MBV : Market-to-Book Value; ROE : Return On Equity; ROA : Return On Asset; RPT : Related Party Transactions Which Are Likely To Result In Expropriation; OC : Ownership Concentration; 
OCSQUARED : Squared Ownership Concentration; AIDT : Independent Directors’ Tenure; BANKS : Number Of Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With; LNRISK : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Risk; LEV : Leverage; 
FSIZE : Firm Size; IDR : Independent Directors’ Ratio; NAB : Non-Affiliated Block Holders; LNAGE : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Age; SG : Sales Growth; RDS : Research & Development Expenditure-To-Sales; CS : 
Capital Expenditure-To-Sales; MS : Marketing & Advertising Expenditure-To-Sales
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Table 8: Correlation matrix (non-family firms) 
 
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCSQUARED AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS 
Q 1.00                   
MBV 0.79 1.00                  
ROE 0.08 0.22 1.00                 
ROA 0.16 0.05 -0.86 1.00                
RPT -0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 1.00               
OC 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.02 -0.14 1.00              
OCSQUARED 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.02 -0.14 0.98 1.00             
AIDT 0.02 0.14 0.07 -0.02 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.00            
BANKS -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 -0.19 -0.10 1.00           
LNRISK 0.35 0.36 0.10 0.06 -0.07 0.23 0.21 0.10 -0.01 1.00          
LEV 0.04 0.15 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.01 1.00         
FSIZE 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.05 -0.08 0.28 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.43 0.34 1.00        
IDR -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 1.00       
NAB -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 1.00      
LNAGE 0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.10 -0.10 1.00     
SG 0.00 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 1.00    
RDS 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00   
CS -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.41 0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 1.00  
MS 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.05 1.00 
 
Q : Tobin’s Q; MBV : Market-to-Book Value; ROE : Return On Equity; ROA : Return On Asset; RPT : Related Party Transactions Which Are Likely To Result In Expropriation; OC : Ownership Concentration; 
OCSQUARED : Squared Ownership Concentration; AIDT : Independent Directors’ Tenure; BANKS : Number Of Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With; LNRISK : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Risk; LEV : 
Leverage; FSIZE : Firm Size; IDR : Independent Directors’ Ratio; NAB : Non-Affiliated Block Holders; LNAGE : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Age; SG : Sales Growth; RDS : Research & Development Expenditure-
To-Sales; CS : Capital Expenditure-To-Sales; MS : Marketing & Advertising Expenditure-To-Sales
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Tables 5 and 6 show that among firm value variables, MBV possess higher fluctuations 
because it has larger standard deviation (1.0694 for family firms and 2.7994 for non-family 
firms); among the independent variables, sales growth (93.2766 for family firms) and non-
affiliated block holders (82.9609 for non-family firms) share the same characteristic.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the correlation matrix for family firms and non-family firms 
respectively. 
 
4.1 Endogeneity issues 
 
We used the Fixed Effect Model (FEM)(Chi, 2005; Liu et.al., 2014; Riadh et.al., 2018) to 
reduce possible endogeneity problems. The Fixed Effect Model (FEM) is expected to reduce 
endogeneity problems arising from omitted variables within the research model (Chi, 2005; 
Boulouta, 2013; Riadh et.al., 2018). 
 
4.2 Research results 
 
Table 9 and Table 10 show the regression results of the Fixed Effects Model for family firms 
and non-family firms respectively. Table 11 shows the combined regression results for both 
family and non-family firms. 
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Table 9:Actual regression results (main results): Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms) 
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 2.6437*** 6.1565 2.2605*** 2.7828 Intercept -0.6374*** -2.7443 -0.2476 -3.3914 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 
-0.0525 -0.6230 -0.0608 -0.3872 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 
 
 
 
0.0028 0.0628 0.0103 0.7050 
Ownership 
Concentration (OC)  
-0.0182 -1.4182 -0.0394 -1.6427 
Ownership 
Concentration (OC) 
 
 
0.0081 1.1842 0.0041 1.8374 
Squared Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 
0.0002 1.5484 0.0005* 1.8644 
Squared Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 
 
 
 
-0.0001 -1.1327 -0.0000 -1.4546 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0624*** -3.5062 -0.0085 -0.2512 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.0320*** 3.2136 0.0119 3.9432 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.1288*** 8.9650 0.1497 6.0202*** Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0243*** 2.4321 0.0068 2.3392 
Leverage (LEV) 0.9014*** 13.8947 0.0395 0.3405 Leverage (LEV) -0.0591 -1.4076 -0.0518 -3.9983 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.1664 -1.2506 -0.3749 -1.5511 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) 
 
 
-0.075283 -0.952057 -0.0401 -1.6619 
Non-Affiliated Block 
Holders (NAB) 
-0.0008* -1.7589 -0.0025*** -2.8771 
Non-Affiliated Block 
Holders (NAB) 
 
 
0.0000197 0.082375 0.0001 0.9031 
Ln (Age) 0.0178 0.5714 -0.0034 -0.0501 Ln (Age) -0.020771 -1.520397 -0.0088 -1.9164 
Sales Growth (SG) 
0.0006 0.5365 0.0002 1.2303 
Sales Growth (SG)  
0.0000995 1.248127 0.0000 1.8107 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) 
0.0041 0.4358 -0.0064 -0.3521 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) 
 
 
 
0.000190 0.038919 0.0006 0.3726 
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Capital 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.0003 0.8302 0.0006 1.0114 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 
 
 
-0.000203 -0.601932 -0.0001 -1.4707 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(MS) 0.0020 0.6879 0.0073 1.4663 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(MS) 
 
 
 
0.0000776 0.035850 -0.0006 -1.0380 
Related Party 
Transactions Which  
Are Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
0.0403 1.0693 0.0231 0.3451 
Related Party 
Transactions Which  
Are Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0147 -0.6160 -0.0074 -1.022 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 
-0.0010 -0.2032 0.0012 0.1248 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 
 
 
 
 
0.0082*** 3.0922 0.0027 3.2901 
OC x BANKS 0.0030 0.7670 0.0029 0.3989 OC x BANKS -0.000604 -0.292600 -0.0005 -0.7655 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0000 -0.8482 -0.0000 -0.4780 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 
 
0.00000821 0.367402 0.0000 0.6399 
N 379  379  N 379  379  
Adjusted R-Squared 
(%) 
 
21.9697 
  
8.8198 
 Adjusted R-Squared 
(%) 4.7152 
  
7.4374 
 
F-Statistic 17.8339***  6.7834***  F-Statistic 3.958723***  5.8045***  
                                        *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level 
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Table 10: Actual regression results (main results): Fixed Effects Model (Non-Family Firms) 
                                
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 2.3659 1.2357 -1.6067 -0.3211 Intercept 0.0510 0.0761 -0.5833* -1.9190 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(BANKS) 0.0731 0.3475 -0.0522 -0.1013 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(BANKS) 0.1312 1.1250 0.0314 0.6103 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC)  -0.0079 -0.3480 -0.0020 -0.0379 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC) 0.0163 1.1023 0.0195*** 2.6607 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0001 0.5543 0.0001 0.2572 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) -0.0002 -1.0661 -0.0002*** -2.6764 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0422 -0.4479 0.1570 0.6441 Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0069 -0.2384 0.0199 1.4785 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.1370*** 3.6489 0.3245*** 3.4759 Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0520** 2.1976 0.0313*** 2.7688 
Leverage (LEV) 1.2651*** 2.8098 5.8500*** 5.1100 Leverage (LEV) 0.3275 1.3184 0.0318 0.2874 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.3123 -0.7140 -0.3034 -0.2736 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) 0.0861 0.3847 -0.0520 -0.5210 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0011* -1.8790 -0.0025* -1.6728 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0005* -1.8918 -0.0001 -1.0147 
Ln (Age) 0.0242 0.1819 0.1063 0.2612 Ln (Age) -0.0378 -0.9415 -0.0371** -1.9967 
Sales Growth 
(SG) -0.0000 -0.0810 0.0008 0.5906 
Sales Growth 
(SG) 0.0001 0.2851 0.0008*** 3.3256 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (RDS) -0.0800 -1.2943 0.0042 0.0295 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (RDS) -0.1126** -2.5573 0.0301** 1.9764 
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Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0019 -1.1813 -0.0044 -1.2456 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0013 -0.8686 -0.0003 -0.4900 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 1.0780 0.8210 1.6709 0.4753 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 0.7980 1.6365 0.1613 0.6714 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are 
Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
 -0.1601 -1.0143 -0.6320 -1.5372 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are 
Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
 -0.0858 -0.9809 0.0199 0.4769 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0124 0.8751 0.0737** 1.9724 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0088 1.2213 0.0060* 1.8860 
OC x BANKS -0.0036 -0.3789 -0.0059 -0.2522 OC x BANKS -0.0070 -1.2882 -0.0028 1.1448 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 0.0000 0.304819 0.0000 0.0680 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 0.0001 1.2360 0.0000 1.2546 
N 92  92  N 92  92  
Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 
7.5928  13.2365  Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 5.3724 
 18.2412  
F-Statistic 2.1893***  3.2081***  F-Statistic 1.8217**  4.2292***  
 
         *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 11: Actual regression results (main results) : Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms And Non-Family 
Firms) 
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 3.082547*** 5.089021 4.9660*** 2.9036 Intercept -0.1463 -0.6228 -0.28270*** -3.2739 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(BANKS) -0.0653 -1.5230 -0.3081** -2.5079 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 
-0.0143 -0.9012 -0.0192*** -3.2865 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC)  -0.0045 -0.3539 0.0183 0.5103 
 Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC) 0.0037 0.7178 0.0094*** 4.9521 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0001 0.5221 -0.0001 -0.1790 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) -0.0000 -0.7872 -0.0001*** -4.48079 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0544** -2.0387 -0.1134 -1.5016 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.0190* 1.8482 0.0120*** 3.2066 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.2559*** 9.5209 0.4839*** 6.3295 Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0403*** 3.8616 0.0168*** 4.3619 
Leverage (LEV) 0.8979*** 6.5552 0.9967** 2.5155 Leverage (LEV) -0.0412 -0.7994 -0.0607*** -3.125809 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.5183** -2.3528 -1.1414* -1.8217 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.1097 -1.3078 -0.0703** -2.2831 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0015*** -3.2938 -0.0035*** -2.6876 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0002 -1.4400 -0.0000 -0.4999 
Ln (Age) 0.0366 0.9125 0.1060 0.9146 Ln (Age) -0.0211 -1.4709 -0.0126** -2.3404 
Sales Growth 
(SG) 0.0000 0.1017 0.0004 0.7189 
Sales Growth (SG) 
0.0001 1.2778 0.0001*** 2.5950 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (RDS) 0.0067 0.4428 0.0195 0.4484 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) 
0.0008 0.1411 0.0001 0.0540 
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Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0005 -0.7107 -0.0002 -0.1069 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0004 -1.0871 -0.0001 -1.1093 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 0.0024 0.3845 0.0063 0.3613 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 0.0005 0.2021 -0.0003 -0.3460 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are 
Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) -0.0482 -0.6831 -0.1254 -0.6221 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are Likely 
To Result In 
Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) -0.0328 -1.2284 -0.0116 -1.1731 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Tenure 
(TENURE) -0.0057 -0.7783 0.0048 0.2284 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 
0.0087*** 3.1910 0.0031*** 3.0591 
Firm Type 
-0.4173*** -3.1230 -1.2855*** -3.3622 Firm Type -0.0612 -1.2399 -0.03271* -1.7868 
Firm Type x 
BANKS 0.0875 0.7810 0.5146 1.6130 
Firm Type x 
BANKS -0.0082 -0.1946 0.0585*** 3.6750 
Firm Type x OC 
x BANKS -0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0075 -0.5371 
Firm Type x OC x 
BANKS 0.0003 0.1722 -0.0018** -2.5308 
Firm Type x 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0000 -0.2214 0.0000 0.2893 
Firm Type x 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000** 2.2400 
N 471  471  N 471  471  
Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 
20.8961  11.7212  Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 6.1513 
 14.3433  
F-Statistic 18.7557***  9.9275***  F-Statistic 5.4070***  12.2591***  
                                        *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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In Table 9, average independent directors’ tenure significantly increases firm value at 1% 
significance level. Very high ownership concentration significantly increases firm value at 10% 
significance level. There is inconclusive evidence on the relationship between firm size and 
firm value. Firm risk significantly increases firm value at 1% significance level. Leverage 
significantly increases firm value at 1% significance level. Non-affiliated block holders 
significantly reduce firm value at 1% and 10% significance level respectively.   
In Table 10, average independent directors’ tenure significantly increases firm value at 
1% and 10% significance level respectively. Lower levels of ownership concentration 
significantly increase firm value at 1% significance level. Higher levels of ownership 
concentration significantly reduce firm value at 1% significance level. Firm risk significantly 
increases firm value at 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. Leverage significantly 
increases firm value at 1% significance level. Non-affiliated block holders significantly reduce 
firm value at 10% significance level. Firm age significantly reduces firm value at 5% 
significance level. Sales growth significantly increases firm value at 1% significance level. 
There is inconclusive evidence on the relationship between R&D expenditure-to-sales and firm 
value. 
In Table 11, average independent directors’ tenure significantly increases firm value at 
1% significance level. The number of domestic banks engaged by the firm significantly reduce 
firm value at 1% and 5% significance level respectively. Lower levels of ownership 
concentration significantly increase firm value at 1% significance level. Higher levels of 
ownership concentration significantly reduce firm value at 1% significance level. There is 
inconclusive evidence on the relationship between firm size and firm value. Firm risk 
significantly increases firm value at 1% significance level. Leverage significantly increases 
firm value at 1% and 5% significance level respectively. The independent directors ratio 
significantly reduces firm value at 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Non-affiliated 
block holders significantly reduce firm value at 1% significance level. Firm age significantly 
reduces firm value at 5% significance level. Sales growth significantly increases firm value at 
1% significance level. Family firms have an overall lower firm value at 1% and 10% 
significance level respectively.  
Tables 9 and 11 show no evidence of a significant relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in family firms. In addition, there is 
inconclusive evidence on whether this significant relationship is stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. There is also no evidence that there is a significant moderating 
effect of ownership concentration at both very high and lower level on the relationship between 
the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in this type of firms. 
There is also no evidence on whether this significant moderating effect at both very high and 
lower level is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms.  
Additionally, the results from Tables 10 and 11 do not support the hypothesis that there 
is relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value 
in non-family firms. Similarly, the moderating effect of ownership concentration at both very 
high and lower level on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value for non-family firms is not supported. 
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Table 12: Actual regression results (main results) : Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms)(Without Absolute Monopoly Industries) 
 
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 2.4583*** 6.9509 3.1652*** 5.6295 Intercept -0.5359** -2.5698 -0.2223*** -3.1017 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 
-0.0444 -0.6242 -0.2171* -1.9064 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(BANKS) 0.0032 0.0807 0.0089 0.6262 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC)  -0.0186* -1.7049 -0.0719*** -4.1070 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC) 0.0082 1.3330 0.0039* 1.7761 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0002* 1.8290 0.0008*** 4.4084 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) -0.0001 -1.1892 -0.0000 -1.4202 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0517*** -3.6409 -0.0127 -0.5691 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.02696*** 3.0389 0.0107*** 3.6275 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.1310*** 9.9490 0.2046*** 10.5356 Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0332*** 3.7864 0.0085*** 2.9533 
Leverage (LEV) 0.8488*** 14.1353 -0.0609 -0.6930 Leverage (LEV) -0.0947*** -2.5959 -0.0561*** -4.4269 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.0445 -0.3913 -0.1689 -0.9541 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.0316 -0.4438 -0.0215 -0.8999 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0006* -1.6678 -0.0010* -1.7832 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) 0.0000 0.1350 0.0000 1.1111 
Ln (Age) -0.0021 -0.0916 -0.0485 -1.2901 Ln (Age) -0.0167 -1.3938 -0.0089** -2.0002 
Sales Growth (SG) 
0.0000 0.5628 0.0001 0.7739 
Sales Growth 
(SG) 0.0001 1.1315 0.0000** 1.9755 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) 
 0.0033 0.4567 0.0034 0.2909 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (RDS) -0.0002 -0.0349 0.0004 0.3007 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) 0.0002 0.6875 0.0005 1.0337 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0001 -0.3381 -0.0001 -1.1025 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 0.0008 0.2982 0.0058 1.3522 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) -0.0012 -0.5761 -0.0011* -1.6643 
26 
 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are Likely 
To Result In 
Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 0.0278 0.8265 -0.0078 -0.1542 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are 
Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) -0.0031 -0.1466 -0.0068 -0.9498 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 
-0.0022 -0.5596 -0.0003 -0.0535 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0026 1.1355 0.0027*** 3.3822 
OC x BANKS 0.0029 0.8795 0.0103* 1.9290 OC x BANKS -0.0004 -0.2003 -0.0004 -0.6653 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0000 -1.0623 -0.0001** -2.0417 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 0.0000 0.1882 0.0000 0.5216 
N 366  366  N 366  366  
Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 
 
24.418 
  
16.0478 
 Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 4.9474 
  
8.0448 
 
F-Statistic 19.6528***  12.0366***  F-Statistic 4.0051***  6.0512***  
 
         *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 13: Actual regression results (main results): Fixed Effects Model (Non-Family Firms)(Without Absolute Monopoly Industries) 
                                
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 3.1283** 2.2964 2.0554 0.7948 Intercept -0.0443 -0.0848 -0.5285* -1.8600 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) -0.0041 -0.0250 -0.1380 -0.4284 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 0.0601 0.6301 0.0151 0.3108 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC)  -0.0216 -1.1278 -0.0355 -0.9600 
Ownership 
Concentration (OC) 
0.0056 0.4400 0.0160** 2.2900 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0003 1.5303 0.0006 1.6022 
Squared Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 
-0.0000 -0.3251 -0.0002** -2.2926 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0703 -1.0541 0.0150 0.1181 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.0079 0.3638 0.0201 1.5942 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0936*** 2.9896 0.1788*** 3.0971 Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0237 1.1810 0.0232** 2.1215 
Leverage (LEV) 0.1618 0.4442 0.6363 0.9220 Leverage (LEV) -0.3846* -1.6961 -0.0622 -0.5762 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.3586 -1.0487 -1.0173* -1.6652 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) 0.0741 0.4202 -0.0404 -0.4306 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0008* -1.7488 -0.0013 -1.4186 
Non-Affiliated Block 
Holders (NAB) 
-0.0004* -1.8282 -0.0001 -0.8434 
Ln (Age) -0.0203 -0.2177 -0.1623 -0.9840 Ln (Age) -0.0423 -1.3953 -0.0392** -2.2533 
Sales Growth (SG) -0.0006 -0.1176 0.0009 0.9295 Sales Growth (SG) 0.0003 0.6119 0.0007*** 3.4182 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) -0.0688 -1.4397 0.0533 0.6264 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) -0.0724** -1.9880 0.0267* 1.8754 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0013 -0.9369 -0.0017 -0.7444 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.0003 0.2328 -0.0002 -0.2366 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) -0.3587 -0.3537 0.3719 0.1910 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
(MS) 0.5271 1.4057 0.0715 0.3152 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are Likely 
To Result In -0.07924 -0.6191 -0.1574 -0.6524 
Related Party 
Transactions Which  
Are Likely To Result 
-0.0348 -0.4907 0.0238 0.606547 
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Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0085 0.7403 0.0491** 2.3241 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0031 0.5340 0.0056* 1.8797 
OC x BANKS 0.0036 0.4825 0.0129 0.8661 OC x BANKS -0.0026 -0.5827 -0.0018 -0.7869 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0001 -0.8015 -0.0002 -1.2851 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS 0.0000 0.4945 0.0000 0.9039 
N 91  91  N 91  91  
Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 
7.6270  7.7883  Adjusted R-Squared 
(%) 2.8906 
 16.5581  
F-Statistic 2.1820***  2.2091***  F-Statistic 1.4261***  3.8408***  
 
         *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 14: Actual regression results (main results): Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms And Non-Family Firms)(Without Absolute 
Monopoly Industries) 
 
Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept 3.0787*** 8.4220 2.6860*** 4.0378 Intercept -0.2205 -1.1128 -0.3238*** -4.1701 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm 
(BANKS) 0.0014 0.0535 -0.0469 -1.0494 
No. of Domestic 
Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (BANKS) 
-0.0087 -0.6713 -0.0191*** -3.6408 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC)  -0.0176*** -2.6418 -0.0202* -1.7533 
 Ownership 
Concentration 
(OC) -0.0002 -0.0438 0.0099*** 5.9754 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0002*** 3.0121 0.0003*** 2.6880 
Squared 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(OCSQUARED) 0.0000 0.0834 -0.0001*** -5.4503 
Firm Size (SIZE) -0.0740*** -4.3715 -0.0253 -0.8089 Firm Size (SIZE) 0.0222** 2.5525 0.0124*** 3.6445 
Ln (Firm Risk) 0.1321*** 10.1993 0.2085*** 10.0281 Ln (Firm Risk) 0.0287*** 3.3808 0.0130*** 3.9785 
Leverage (LEV) 0.8462*** 13.2461 -0.0158 -0.1557 Leverage (LEV) -0.0948** -2.2952 -0.0777*** -4.7999 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.0848 -0.6881 -0.4279** -2.0246 
Independent 
Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.0420 -0.5999 -0.0205 -0.7458 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0008*** -2.8728 -0.0013*** -2.7051 
Non-Affiliated 
Block Holders 
(NAB) -0.0001 -0.5069 -0.0000 -0.8003 
Ln (Age) 0.0056 0.2013 -0.0567 -1.100 Ln (Age) -0.0190 -1.6023 -0.0167*** -3.3812 
Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000 0.3422 0.0002 1.0380 Sales Growth (SG) 0.0001 0.9460 0.0001*** 2.5923 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (RDS) -0.0011 -0.1201 0.0062 0.3651 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales (RDS) 
-0.0029 -0.6325 0.0021 1.1388 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) 0.0001 0.1846 0.0005 0.8464 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0002 -0.6513 -0.0001 -0.5877 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) 0.0000 0.0039 0.0054 1.0071 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales (MS) -0.0015 -0.6337 -0.0010 -1.0268 
Related Party 
Transactions 0.0210 0.5713 -0.0005 -0.0090 
Related Party 
Transactions -0.0046 -0.2085 -0.0021 -0.2425 
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Which  Are Likely 
To Result In 
Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
Which  Are Likely 
To Result In 
Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0004 0.0989 0.0119 1.5418 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure 
(TENURE) 0.0033 1.4753 0.0035*** 3.9514 
Firm Type 
-0.2300*** -2.6962 -0.4196*** -2.7220 Firm Type -0.0184 -0.4497 -0.0328** -1.9780 
Firm Type x 
BANKS -0.0353 -0.5416 0.1861 1.6118 
Firm Type x 
BANKS -0.0360 -1.0288 0.0594*** 4.1800 
Firm Type x OC x 
BANKS 0.0025 0.9120 -0.0060 -1.2407 
Firm Type x OC x 
BANKS 0.0016 1.0458 -0.0019*** -2.9586 
Firm Type x 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0000 -1.1627 0.0000 0.9491 
Firm Type x 
OCSQUARED x 
BANKS -0.0000 -0.9089 0.0000*** 2.6786 
N 457  457  N 457  457  
Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 
21.0099  14.6566  Adjusted R-
Squared (%) 3.0223 
 11.5387  
F-Statistic 18.3521***  12.2038***  F-Statistic 3.0331***  9.5095***  
 
                                        *
 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level
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To ensure robustness of the results, industry effects are controlled by excluding industries where 
either family or non-family firms dominate the industries (i.e. excluding absolute monopoly industries5). 
If there is no control on industry effects, regression results can be biased (Porter, 1980), given the political 
economy of Malaysia (Gomez et. al., 2018). The results in Tables 12 and 14 now evidence a significant 
negative relationship (at 1% and 10% significance level) between the number of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and firm value among family firms after excluding family firms with monopoly in 
certain industries. However, there is no conclusive evidence that this significant negative relationship is 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. At lower level of ownership concentration, there 
is a significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value among family firms, after excluding 
family firms with monopoly in certain industries,  at 10% significance level. However, at very high level 
of ownership concentration, there is a significant negative moderating effect of ownership concentration 
(at 5% significance level) on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value among family firms after excluding family firms with monopoly in certain industries 
 Generally, there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that 
the firm engages with and firm value among family firms without monopoly in certain industries. 
However, there is no evidence that the significant positive moderating effects of ownership concentration 
at lower level and the significant negative moderating effects of ownership concentration at very high 
level on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engaged with and firm value 
is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. On the same note, Tables 13 and 14 do not 
support the notion that there is a relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in non-family firms without monopoly in certain industries. The moderating effect 
of ownership concentration at both very high and lower level on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value is also not evidenced. 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
 
This study reveals two findings. Firstly, there is a significant negative relationship between the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in family firms only after excluding family 
firms with monopoly in certain industries. This negative relationship is also observed by Fok et.al. (2004) 
whereby the number of domestic banks that the firm engaged with reduces firm value. However, this 
significant negative relationship is not stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Hence, 
hypothesis 1a is supported whereas 1b is not supported.  
 
5 As discussed earlier some family firms in Malaysia have monopoly in certain industries and from non-family 
context, Government Linked Companies (GLCs) or Government Investment Linked Companies (GLICs) operate 
in the utilities and telecommunication industries (Gomez et.al., 2018). 
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Secondly, at lower level of ownership concentration, there is a significant positive moderating 
effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in family firms only after excluding family firms with monopoly in certain 
industries. However, this significant positive moderating effect does not appear to be stronger in family 
firms compared to non-family firms. Hence, hypothesis 2a is supported but 2b is not supported. Similarly, 
at very high level of ownership concentration, there is a significant negative moderating effect of 
ownership concentration on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in family firms without monopoly in certain industries. However, there is no evidence 
that this significant negative moderating effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
Hence, hypotheses 2c and 2d are not supported. 
There are two important implications of this research. First, we evidence that the number of 
domestic banks engaged by the firm is associated with expropriation in family firms in the Malaysian 
institutional context. Family firms within non-absolute monopoly industries encounter higher market 
competition, therefore, their controlling shareholders possess higher incentives to expropriate through 
the domestic banks that their firms engaged with. Second, consistent with the incentive alignment and 
corporate reputational effects, ownership concentration has a significant positive moderating effect on 
the firm value effects due to the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms but only at lower 
level of ownership concentration. At lower level of ownership concentration, an increase in ownership 
concentration allow the controlling shareholders of family firms to increase their corporate control and 
resolve the Agency Problem Type I prevailing in their firms. Interestingly, corporate reputational effects 
have a positive influence on the controlling shareholders of such firms by aligning their interests with the 
interests of minority shareholders. However, at very high level of ownership concentration, ownership 
concentration instead has a significant negative moderating effect on the firm value effects due to the 
number of domestic banks engaged by family firms. This is contrary to what is argued in the hypotheses 
development section. In the context of the Malaysian institutional setting where investor protection is 
relatively poorer compared to developed markets, family owners with very high shareholding become 
entrenched (Claessens et.al, 2002) and they may take the opportunity to extract financial resources from 
their firms through their close relationship with domestic banks (Faccio et.al, 2001b). This explains the 
significant negative moderating effect. Consequently, controlling shareholders of family firms within 
non-absolute monopoly industries should ensure that they possess lower ownership stakes in their firms 
which is crucial for good corporate governance as evidenced by the research results. This is an important 
capital structure decision and family owners in non-absolute monopoly industries can achieve this goal 
by selling more equity to outside investors and incur less debt if their firms want to raise capital. The SC 
can play a critical role in this aspect by implementing policies which encourage lower level of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership among public-listed firms particularly targeting family firms within non-
absolute monopoly industries.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
There is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by 
family firms and firm value in the context of the Malaysian socio-political institutional setting. 
The higher the number of domestic banks that the firm engages, the lower the firm value. This 
is consistent with the arguments that domestic banking relationship could lead to abuse and 
expropriation by firms particularly family firms, within poor institutional environment such as 
Malaysia and other emerging markets. Further, lower level of ownership concentration shows 
a significant positive moderating effect on expropriation due to the number of domestic banks 
engaged by family firms. This contradicts arguments that in developing economies, corporate 
reputational effects are deemed as a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies. Our findings 
support Mazzelli et. al. (2018) concept of “conformity-in-distinctiveness” where family firms 
conform to the behaviour of other family firms rather than industry norms in order to avoid 
social losses as well as the concept ‘‘distinctiveness-inconformity’’ introduced for non-family 
firms, which for economic reasons, are less likely to imitate the innovations of non-family 
firms than the innovations of family firms.  
We posit that given the concern with reputational effects following the infamous 
Transmile case that attracted significant attention and monitoring by SC, family controlling 
shareholders tend to reduce expropriation when their shareholding increase; hence, the 
significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration. However, this occur only 
at lower level of controlling shareholders’ ownership. At very high level of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership, a significant negative moderating effect on expropriation due to the 
number of domestic banks engaged by family firms occur in the context of the Malaysian 
capital markets. This proves that at very high level of shareholding, the entrenchment 
hypothesis is relevant to family owners whereby they extract financial resources from their 
firms through the close relationship between their firms and the domestic banks, at the expense 
of minority shareholders. As espoused by Chrisman et.al. (2018), our study adds to the 
research that the behaviors of family firms are influenced by formal and informal governance 
mechanisms that exist within or outside their boundaries and the principal-principal agency 
theory can be an integral part of future research agenda on family firms. 
This research provides some insights to both academia and industry regarding the 
consequences of domestic banking relationship and different levels of concentrated ownership 
in family firms in an emerging market. These insights can help improve the corporate 
governance as well as ownership structure of Malaysian public-listed family firms which 
dominate the capital market. Our findings refute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) by 
demonstrating that corporate reputational effects may be a substitute for institutional 
deficiencies. 
This research has focused only on family and non-family firms. Given the political 
economy of Malaysia, it is suggested that future research investigate the behavior of 
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government-linked and politically connected firms. Future research could examine minority 
shareholder expropriation using a qualitative approach to identify what factors influence such 
expropriation. Such factors may include the firm’s management style, leadership style, quality 
of institutions, institutional transitions, strategic changes, structure of a business group and 
other related factors. Such insights are equally important to enhance our understanding of 
corporate governance in emerging economies (Young et.al., 2008).  
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